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Summary findings
Has the revival  of the Andean  Pact affected  the industrial  * The effect of regional variety is at best mixed. This
growth of Bolivia,  Colombia,  and Ecuador?  Has this regional  lends preliminary support to the argument that
agreement  had greater  effects  than unilateral  liberalization?  unilateral liberalization will have a positive impact
Madani explores two potential channels for industrial  on output growth through  the channel of imported
growth: scale effects and variety of imported  intermediate inputs.
intermediate inputs.  There is significant heterogeneity in industry-level
She analyzes data from 22 industries (classified at the  returns to scale. Moreover, in the three Andean countries
three-digit level of ISIC) across three countries. The  studied, cross-industry scale effects were small and
results show that:  negative. Therefore,  the three countries should not
The variety of intermediate inputs originating from  expect large or across-the-board gains through scale
nonregional partners has a significant positive  effects from their regional arrangement.
impact on growth in a handful of industries.
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The late-1980s  and early  1990s have  witnessed  a renewed  interest  in regional  integration
in both the academic  and policy realms.  The further  integration of the European  community  and
the  creation  of NAFTA  have  fanned  this  interest.  Fear  of losing  access  to  these  markets  has
prompted  some  developing  countries  to  form  such  schemes,  strengthen  old  agreements  or
investigate  the potential  for one.  A few examples  include Mercosurl,  the  Andean Pact,  CACM2
and  ASEAN3'4. A  major  question  that  has  arisen  from  these  pursuits  is  whether  a  regional
arrangement  has  growth  effects  that  are  significant  enough  to  warrant  a  developing  country
joining  such a scheme.
This  research  proposes  to  answer  a  more  specific  question:  how  does  adherence  to  a
regional  arrangement  affect  a developing  country's  industrial growth?  I use two  mechanisms  to
capture  this  impact:  economies  of  scale  and  increased  variety  of intermediate  imports.  In the
presence  of  scale  economies,  the  literature  predicts  that  gains  from  specialization  and
agglomeration  associated  with  regionalism  and  integration  will  be  enhanced.  Caballero  and
Lyons  (1990,  1992) find  no support  for within  industry  scale, but rather  a  strong  cross-industry
scale  effect  for  a sample  of developed  countries.  The authors  argue  that  their  "results  suggest
that  the  opportunities  for  unexploited  increasing  returns  in  manufacturing  are  much  less
widespread  than  the [European]  Commission's  (1988a) analysis concludes  (1990:824)"'.
'  Created in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.  Chile and Bolivia became associates in 1996.
2  Central American Common Market (CACM) was founded in 1960 by Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and
Guatemala and revived in the early 1990s with a strong trade impact. The Andean Pact consists of Bolivia. Chile (left in
1976), Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela and was established in 1969. It was revised and reinvigorated in the late
l 980s with reported strong impact on the level and intensity of its internal trade.
3ASEAN  was established in  1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Philippines (Brunei joined in 1984 and
Vietnam in 1995) as more of an agreement to foster peace and cooperation in the region than promote trade. The non-
priority of trade relations is clear from the little impact the agreement has had on intra-regional trade.
4For  more details on these regional agreements, refer to F. Fouroutan 's March 1998 "does Membership in an FTA Make a
Country more or less Protectionist?", WPS # 1898, DEC/RG, World Bank.
5All the authors  of  the three chapters  dedicated  to the analysis  of the potential  gains  from  economies  of scale in EC
1988 publication  Research  on The Cost  of Non-Europe,  Basic Findings,  Volume  2  agree  that European
integration  will  lead to a definite  exploitation  of  economies  of scale (EOS).  For  instance,  C.  Pratten  argues
that  "there  are substantial  scale effects for products  and production  runs to be obtained  in a wide range of
manufacturing  industries"  (pg. 162).  J. Schwalbach  presents  estimates  of  changes  in plant sizes  and  cost
improvements  due to increased trade for U.K.  and Gernany  for the years  1965 and  1982.  He finds that for
Germany,  "trade  flows (during  the period  1965-1982)  basically  doubled plant sizes within  the observed  time
period"  (pg.  192).  He also reports that  plant size improved  cost efficiency.Intermediate imports can affect growth by being conduits of technological knowledge
across two countries. I test whether increased variety of intermediate imports, realized through
liberalization of trade, has a growth impact.  Two import variety measures are used to test this
proposition.
I  incorporate the two mechanisms of the regional effects using  an expanded growth
accounting methodology.  The analysis focuses on industry level (3 digit ISIC) data for three
Andean Pact countries over 16 to 23 years.  To our knowledge,  no dis-aggregated analysis of the
impact of regional arrangements has been done for developing countries and specifically for the
Andean Pact.
The  results  provide  new  insight  into  the  industrial  structure  of  three  developing
economies.  The three  Andean  Countries  in  our  study have  very  small,  negative external
economies. These results are in  line with work by Basu and Fernald (1995) and reject the
argument proposed by Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992)  that large positive externalities exist at
the manufacturing level. We also find that there is significant heterogeneity in industry scale
effect, in line with work by Burnside (1996).  Therefore, not all industries would benefit from
the potential scale effect engendered by regional integration.  These results provide empirical
support from  developing, economies  on  analysis thus  far  undertaken  largely  on  developed
6 countries manufacturing sectors
Regarding the role of imports, namely intermediate imports, the results show that the
non-regional (ROW) suppliers and goods variety have a positive, small and significant  effect for
a handful of industries.  The corresponding regional measures bring out a more mixed picture.
They seem to have very little positive impact on output growth. Finally, we could not validate
that the regional revival vs. unilateral liberalization had an impact on industry and cross-industry
scales.
The implications of these findings are two folds.  First, I find preliminary and weak
support that unilateral liberalization will have a positive impact on industry level output growth
via the channel of imported intermediate inputs. Second, given the heterogeneity of the industry
scale effects and the very small cross-industry externality, the countries in this study should not
expect large or across the board gains from their regional arrangement via scale effects.
6 One recent exception is the article by Feenstra, et. al. (1999). "Testing Endogenous Growth in South Korea and
Taiwan", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 60.
2This paper is structured as follows.  Section II reviews the literature while section III
contains a brief overview of the developments in the Andean Pact.  Section IV lays out the
theoretical construct of the exercise.  Section V provides the empirical analysis.  Section VI
concludes.
II.  Literature Review
The literature lays out several avenues through which integration can affect growth. The
more traditional approach credits integration with expanding markets and therefore providing the
domestic industries who are confined by the size of their national market an opportunity to gain
from internal economies of scale.  This would  improve production efficiency and engender
growth.  Industries may  also benefit from the  agglomeration resulting from  the  integration
process. Finally, integration may influence industries via cross-industry externalities.
The endogenous growth theory argues that benefits accrue to an industry and an economy
through the economies of scale engendered by increased "trade knowledge".  Trade knowledge
includes and can be modeled as gains from foreign R&D embodied in traded goods, technology
transfer  through  trade  or  foreign  direct  investment,  process  innovation,  best  practice
implementation, and imported intermediate goods variety and quality.  Furtherrnore, domestic
human capital stock is built up due to exposure to new and more sophisticated intermediate and
final goods (learning by doing, copying,)7.
The literature has  attempted to  capture the  growth effects of  a  regional  integration
agreement (RIA)  in  a  variety of  methods.  They include  theoretical modeling,  simulation
exercises, and empirical analysis (econometric evaluations).  Baldwin and Venables (B&V,
1995) provide a succinct and valuable survey  of this  literature.  While both  theoretical and
simulation exercises  provide invaluable insight into  the  topic, this  research  will  pursue  a
disaggregated empirical  (econometric) approach.  This  is  because  the  issue  at  hand  can
ultimately only be settled through empirical analysis.  However, according to B&V (1995) this
aspect of the analysis is far from mature 8.
For a sample of recent works in this area see Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996;  Coe and Helpman, 1995;  Ben-David,
1994, 1995, 1996.
8 According to B&V, the empirical analysis in this area is "...far from mature, ... but tentatively suggests that some
RlAs have had a positive impact on growth, at least in Europe (1995:1627-28)".
3The empirical  studies  are typically  based  on  Solow's  neo-classical  growth  model.  They
assume  perfect  competition  and  constant  returns  to  scale.  They  use  a  variety  of  independent
variables  and focus  on the analysis  of aggregate  cross-country  data or aggregate  time  series  data
for a single country.  Most authors  have attempted  to integrate the impact  of RIA  using  dummy
variables  (Brada  & Mendez,  1988;  Casella,  1996) or a measure of inter and  intra- regional  trade
volumes  and  flows  amongst  member  countries  (Italianer,  1994; Caceres,  1994)  . Some  have
attempted  to incorporate  the dynamic  effect  of integration  by using  investment  series  (De Melo,
et.  al.,  1993)  and  human  capital  (Henrekson,  et.al,  1996).  Most  studies  use  the  EC  as  an
empirical  example9.
An  exception  to this  trend  is the  1988  study  by Brada and  Mendezl°  in which  they  find
very  small  growth  effects  and  conclude  that  while  RIA  dynamic  effects  exist,  they  play  an
insignificant  role  on the  growth rate  of member  country  outputs.  A  more  recent  work  by  De
Melo,  et. al. (1992)  supports  the same  conclusion".  De Melo, et.  al. (1993)  attempt  to capture
the  dynamic  effects  of  regional  integration  on  growth  by  incorporating  human  capital  and
investment.  They  find  that  the  former  only  contributes  significantly  to  growth  in  developing
nations.  Investment  has  significant  dynamic  effect  on  growth  across  all  countries  while
adherence  to a regional  arrangement  does not impact long term growth'2.
9 Henrekson  et. al. (1996)  also includes  EFTA.
10  Their study spans 1951-77 and estimates the dynamic effects of six RIAs, including  3 in developing countries
(CACM, LAFTA and EACM). Their country level analysis finds that for five out of six Regional integration
agreements' investment levels had increased. In two out of six agreements,  technological progress had
occurred as well. However, overall, they find very small growth effects of these agreements. "The largest gain
was achieved by the member countries of LAFTA for whom these dynamic effects, cumulated over the period
1960-1977,  resulted in 1977 GNPs 1.09% higher than they would have been without integration (1988:163)".
They conclude that while there are dynamic effects from regional agreements,  they play an insignificant role
on the growth rate of member country outputs.
Their study includes a cross-sectional aggregate analysis of  seven regional agreements, including four developing
countries' (SACU, LAFTA, CACM and CEAO . Their study spans 1960-1985  and includes 23 developed and
78 developing nations.  They use dummy variables in a basic neo-classical  growth model to represent
adherence to different RIAs and conclude that such a membership does not significantly impact growth.
The authors do point out that the statisical insignificance of RIA dummies' may be related to their correlation
with other regressors (investment). In fact they find that investment  rates in the EC and especially EFTA was
some five- percent higher than in other developed countries. This would suggest a degree of dynamic effect of
RIA on growth.  They find no support for the inclusion of economies  of scale.
4III.  Why the Andean Pact?  13
The Andean Pact, established b.y  the Cartagena agreement in 1969 by Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Venezuela' 4,  was created with a common market goal in mind. It s
earlier mandate emphasized economic cooperation in the guise of trade liberalization, investment
and  industrialization policies for the region' 5. By the  late  1980s, it had known periods of
relatively small success of promoting internal tariff reduction and intra-regional trade growth.
The small success is mainly attributed to two factors.  One is the 1980s debt crisis.  The other
reason lay  in  the original  Andean Pact  agreement.  This latter blended regional  industrial
planning and concessionary measures,  which created enough exceptions as to minimize the
impact of the RIA to  a small trade  effect.  According to  Echevarria (1998), regional trade
constituted less than two percent of total trade at the time.
The Declaration of  Ica in  198916  initiated the revival of the Pact and free trade was
established in 1991. Since then the Andean Pact trade, patterns have altered dramatically (Yeats.
1998; Echavarria, 1998). The three countries in this study (Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) show
a noted and rapid increase in their total and relative industrial imports from regional partners. see
Graphs 1-6.  Echavarria (1998) notes the same phenomenon on the export side.  In fact, these
exports to regional partners grew 5 times faster than manufactured exports to the world.
All  members of the  Pact also implemented extensive unilateral liberalization almost
simultaneously with this regional revival.  Bolivia, the early reformer, started its program in the
mid-1980s and by 1992, its weighted average ad-valorem tariff rate was nine percent, a reduction
of more than 50% compared to 1986.  Colombia cut its weighted average ad-valorem tariff rate
from 45% in 1988 to 21% in 1990 and to 11% by 1992. Venezuela reduced its ad-varolem tariff
rate from 26% in  1988 to  12% in 1992 and Ecuador's rates went from 29% to  10% between
1990-92.  Furthermore, most non-tariff barriers were eliminated in the region by  1991:  their
coverage was zero percent  in Bolivia and Ecuador in 1991-1992, one percent in Colombia and
five percent in Venezuela (Echavarria, 1998; Edwards, 1995).
13  See Appendix  for  country  specific  information.
4  Chile  was  a member  but withdrew  in 1976.
It also provided concessionary measures for its less developed members such as Bolivia and Ecuador.
16  One such instance of intra-regional trade growth was during the late 70s and before the debt crisis.
5The evolution of the Andean Pact has registered a noted effect on its members'  trade
pattern.  More  specifically,  its  vigorous revival  in  the  early  1  990s, has  led  to  increased
manufacturing goods exports to  (and imports from) regional partners.  We anticipate that by
extension their industrial growth should be affected by this reorientation.  The simultaneous
unilateral liberalization of its members has created an  interesting backdrop for us to  test the
theoretical implications of the literature on regionalism and growth.
IV.  Theoretical Base and Applications
The early theoretical and empirical analysis of growth is based on the assumption of
perfect  competition and  constant returns to  scales and  uses  a  general production function,
Y = A.f (K,,L,,M,).  A  is the index of Hicks-neutral technological progress, and  f  (.)  is a
continuous, twice differentiable function that is homogeneous of degree one in capital  (K,),
labor (L,) and material  (M,).  We differentiate Y, and manipulate the resulting expression to
obtain equation (1).
(1)  dy, =s,,dl,  ±Sk,dk,  +s,,,,,  dm, +da,  or
(Ib)  dy, = dx, + da,
where dx, = s,,dl, + sk,dk,  + s,,,  d,,
dy,  = ln(Y§) - ln(Y_ ,);dl,  = ln(L,)  - ln(L, ,);dk,  = ln(K,)  - ln(K,1);da,  =ln(A,)  - ln(A,,)
and dm,  = ln(M, ) - ln(M,  ).  sI,,  ISk,  s,  are average (over two periods t and t- 1) of shares of
labor, capital and material in total gross output respectively1 7. Equation (1) states that output
growth is a function of changes of weighted shares in factors and inputs plus total factor
productivity (henceforth TFP). The latter reflecting the exogenous, "unexplained" element of
growth.
17 The literature favors the use of cost shares instead of revenue shares (Hall, 1990; Basu and Fernald, 1996).  In the
presence of imperfect competition, revenue shares may lead to potential mis-measurement in the  contribution of
factors to growth" 7. However, we do not have the necessary data for such calculations.  We proceed with revenue
shares, heeding the fact that our calculations include potential calculation bias.
6A.  Accounting for Economies of Scale
Subsequent work within the growth framework  by Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992) and
Basu and Fernald (1996) and Burnside (1996) extend the work by Solow (1956) and Hall (1988,
1990) to  investigate the presence of scale effects versus (cross industry) external economies of
scale.
We apply Caballero and Lyons methodology to industry level data of the three Andean
Pact countries (Appendix I lays out their model more fully). We analyze the impact of regional
integration on industry growth for three Andean Pact countries in light of scale effects and
(cross-industry) external economies of scale.  This is to investigate the general claim made in the
integration literature that, in the presence of externalities, the impact of such arrangements is
18 several fold larger
Caballero and Lyons point out  that in estimating industry level growth (equation (2)
below) we need to take into account the fact that the industry level (I) and aggregate level inputs
(xi,  and  x,)  will be positively correlated.  In the presence of external effects (cross-industry
externality), therefore, the estimated coefficient in equation (2), will be upward biased 19. They
model external effects as x,  x,, and its coefficient,  K  =  in equation (3). K is expected
to carry a positive value and capture the impact of cross-industry  externality on industry i.
20 The error term (ga, + u,,) is unobservable here
(2)  dyJ, = ydxc, + (e,,  + da,, )
(3)  dy,,  = ydx,  + Kdx, + (fda,  + u;,)
I  Specifically,  existence  of cross-industry  externality  should  benefit  member  nations  for it increases  production
efficiency.  Also,  if there  is industry  scale  effect  then,  as suggested  by the theoretical  and  simulation  literature,
developing  countries  adhering  to an RIA could  experience  large  benefits
19  In the presence  of external  effects,  therefore,  the estimated  coefficient  in equation  (2), called 9 from  now on,
will be upward  biased. In fact, according  to C&B  (1990),
plim  9  + y/K,  where  y/  2 
dx,
Note  that  s  - -
7where x,, = a,a,  'i + a 2 i,k 11 + a3t,  m,, and  a,,, a,,k5,a,nj  are shares of  labor, capital and materials in
industry I. y  represents economies of scale (here, and for the moment, we constrain y to be the
same for all industries)  a,, productivity (TFP)  index and e 1,  represents the external economy
(cross-industry) index.  Both are assumed to be unobservable in equation (2) and therefore part
of the error term.
We will concentrate on the estimation of equation (3).
B.  Introducing measures of integration
We use three measures to capture the potential impact of the revival of the RIA. The first
two measures are constructed with the understanding that trade is an  essential conduit of the
impact of integration on growth 2'  and that increased variety of intermediate imports plays an
important role in output growth. The use of these two alternative measures is to better gauge the
sensitivity and  accuracy of our results.  The third measure is the prevalent approach in  the
literature (Casella, 1996; De Melo, et. al., 1993): a dummy variable, which takes on a value of
one starting in 1991.
B2. Import Variety Measures.
How would increased intermediate imports initiate a within  and  cross-industry scale
response?  Compared to  an  autarkic  anti-monde, implementation of  an  RIA  will  increase
availability of differentiated intermediate inputs 22, which leads to a scale effect and increased
industrial growth 23. More specifically, we view the new varieties of intermediate imports as
stores  of  foreign  knowledge., We  conceptualize that  they have  a  strong  industry  specific
knowledge  accumulation  component,  and  a  more  diffuse  overall/general  knowledge
21  This, of course, is not a new idea. The endogenous growth literature has used the trade conduit as a modeling
tool.  See Ben-David (various papers) and Coe and Helpman (1996) for examples.
22 The South-South RIA of  the Andean Pact can be likened to the Grossman  & Helpman narrow gap imitation
scenario (chp 11,  pg. 294-298). They assume a North-South framework, with the former innovating and the
latter imitating (and potentially innovating less intensively).  The narrow gap refers to the fact that the gap in
manufacturing costs between North and South is not wide.
23  See appendix for the outline of the new growth model.
8component  24.  They affect the knowledge base in the importing country in the following two
complementary manners. At the cross-industry level, they enlarge the general, public base of
knowledge, providing further incentives for innovation by reducing innovation costs across all
industries. Also, availability of new varieties of intermediate improves  production efficiency and
lowers input costs in industries using them for production of final goods 25.
In practice, of course, we do not have a purely autarkic empirical anti-monde for none of
the RIA members in this study has been entirely excluded from the world trading system in the
1970-1995 period.  Rather we have a situation where countries make a graduated move from
more restrictive trade practices to less restrictive (but possibly more distorted) ones.  Thus, our
experiment is essentially of whether the changes entailed in the RIAs have increased the net
supply (quantity and quality) of intermediates. We control for the potential impact of unilateral
liberalization by introducing import variety measures calculated for non-RIA member suppliers
into our  analysis.  This  allows us to  simultaneously gain some insight into the  impact of
unilateral liberalization on these countries 26.
We construct alternative indices of  variety that capture the shocks of new  imported
intermediate inputs.  They can be formulated using available three digit ISIC or four digit SITC
data over individual supplier countries or  blocks of supplier countries, see  below. The two
indices for variety  considered here are: first date of imports as measured by the number of
suppliers and first date of imports as measured by an index of goods variety.  Below we provide
details about these measures.
24 Another way of modeling this dichotomy in the knowledge accumulation is to argue that the human capital is so
specialized and productive in the set -up of the specific industry it is working in that  it will "extract" more
knowledge from its industry specific imports  than the rest of the industries  could. Alternatively, we could
argue The human capital is differentiated  by industry and therefore is less productive when having to absorb
(or invent) in a general arena versus  its own specific industry.
25 We do not directly model the prerequisites  for an agglomeration outcome since it requires cross-country factor
movements (which we abstract from in our basic model in Appendix 1) and involves the more detailed analysis
of centripetal and centrifugal economic  forces between the integrating (see also Puga and Venables, 1997;
Ruhashyankiko 1997). Therefore, we abstract from arguing that within industry externalities are directly
correlated to agglomeration effects  resulting from the RIA We still attribute these externalities to the increased
variety of intermediate inputs.
26  Variety trade diversion can increase the regional varieties as the expense of  larger numbers of varieties from the
rest of the world. This may be especially relevant if the regional grouping is not variety rich.
9a.  Goods Variety
We construct a variety measure described in Feenstra and Markusen (1994). Starting out
with a single, competitive firm with constant returns to scale, and assuming a CES production
function:
(4)  Y=  f (x, N)  =  ax,,  0 < 0 < 1,
where x is the quantity of inputs i = 1,...,  N  and x = (x, ...,  XNx)  denotes the vector of inputs, and
Y  is the output.  The elasticity of substitution between the inputs is given by  a  = X(I-  )
Pi  > 0 is the price of inputs and assume that  xi  >0 solves the cost minimization problem of the
firm.
Assuming two ranges of inputs  N, < N,, Feenstra and Markusen (1994) shoNv  that:
FN, 1
(5)  f(x,N,)  = f(x,N,)AS'O,  where A =  j  and  21.
The outputs obtained with the ranges of inputs at times  s (denoted N,  ) and t (denoted N, )
(N,  < N, ) are related by a "growth factor" 2  that is measurable as the ratio of expenditure on
the full (N,)  versus the restricted set (N,  ) of inputs 27. As  0  becomes smaller  2  increases
because the new inputs become less substitutable for existing inputs, leading to larger increases
in  output.
Feenstra et. al.(1999) and Madani (1997) use a closely related methodology and  highly
dis-aggregated exports to the US to estimate the impact of relative industrial goods variety for
Taiwan (China) and Korea on their industrial growth. For each industry I, changes in variety is
captured by:
10zP ,x,,  t  /PmX,,,
(6)  VAR,,,,  -In  liEN,  eN
nEN,  tJEN  }
Where p,,,  x,,,  is the value of input x,,,  by industrial category I from supplier n at time t.
In our case, we consider the imported inputs variety and therefore, to interpret equation
(6) above, consider the case where the set of imports is growing, and denote these sets by
G, = {1..,  N, }  and G, = {1.., N, }  with G, > G,,.  Then the common set of imports supplied in
both periods is N = N,,, and the denominator  of the equation above is unity. The numerator will
exceed unity, indicating that product variety has increased.  This formula fits the case where
goods disappear as well.
The variety measure is calculated for two subsets of importers:  the members of  the
regional  agreement (variable VARREG) and  the non-members (rest  of the  world - called
VARROW) and for each country's 22 3-digit industries  over 26 years.
Estimation of equation (3) above is therefore altered to:
(3')  dy,, = a,  + ydx,,  + K,dx,  + 77,VARROW(-1)  + 0,VARREG(-1)  + [4da, + u,]
Given the assumption of south-south RIA underlying our analysis (see appendix2) and
the fact that these economies have relatively similar industrial structure (especially compared to
developed countries), we expect very little regional variety effect.  The assumption that ROW
will have a larger variety of intermediate inputs to offer industries of RIA member countries
leads us to expect unilateral liberalization to have a positive - and larger - impact on output
growth than import of intermediate inputs from other RIA members.
There are two drawbacks to this method. First, we  may not pick up too much variation
in product variety due to the aggregate nature of the data 28. Second, our data is on import values
27 See  proposition  1  of the Feenstra  & Markusen  (1994)  paper.
28 We have constructed  the 4 digit SITC version of this measure and will investigate this aggregation issue at a later
date.
11in US dollars.  We do not have complete data on unit values.  Our numbers may therefore be
biased by changes in import prices.
Clearly, imported goods are used as intermediate inputs in different industries and as final
goods.  Thus, using our variety measure, we could pick up several effects:  a complementary
effect of intermediate goods on industrial production; a competitive effect of these intermediate
goods on the import competing industries; a competitive effects of  imported final goods on
domestic industrial production. In the two latter cases the negative correlation between increased
imports and domestic industrial production springs from the rationalization of domestic industry
faced with foreign competition.  We are interested in the first effect:  the complementary effect
of intermediate imports.
Our series are scaled to isolate the complementary  effects of regional vs. ROW suppliers
of  import  variety  on  output  growth  from  its  competitive impact.  We  hypothesize  that
complementary imported varieties will have a positive impact on output.  In other words this
complementarity arises from the fact that these imported varieties are intermnediate  inputs feeding
into - and improving - the production process of the domestic industries.  This interpretation
meshes in well with our theoretical model (appendix 2), wvhere  there is assumed substitution
among intermediate inputs, but no redundancy.
Our trade data mirrors the same potential scrambling of signals/effects as above.  The
three  digit ISIC-categorized imports are not  all used  by the  industry associated with  their
category.  Rather, they represent all imports into the country that match this type of industrial
categorization.  For instance, imports categorized as 311 (food products) are not all used in the
Colombian food products industry.  Rather, they are imports that matched the category 311 and
will be distributed across the economy to be used as intermediate inputs or final goods.
We attempt to  isolate  the complementary effect by  scaling our supplier and  import
variety measures with country specific input-output tables 29. Our measures are weighted so that:
(7)  wVAR,,,  = EvjVARj,,
where  v,,  is obtained from the input-output table and is the share of inputs by industry I  into
industry J.  The scaled variety series used in industry J therefore accounts for all potential variety
changes from all its industrial suppliers.
29 1982  input-output  tables  for Colombia,  1988  for Bolivia,  1986  for Ecuador.
12b.  First Date of Imports as Measured by the Number of Suppliers:
We use this measure to pinpoint the date of first import from a foreign supplier. Assume
Colombia is our importing country and its supplier is country Z. The available three digit ISIC-
categorized Colombian imports are differentiated by their supplier country.  This will allow us to
argue that first date of import from supplier country Z represents launching a new variety of
intermediate good in the Colombian industry.  In consequent years, we register the entry or exit
of suppliers.  Tracking the change in the pool of suppliers over  1970-1994 for each industry
provides a good proxy for the import variety available in the Colombian market before and after
the RIA renewal 30.
In this case, we hypothesize that against a backdrop of restrictive trade practices, adding
a new supplier (a new variety of intermediate input) to the existing pool of suppliers will be
interpreted  as  easing access  into the  Colombian market. Our  measure  of  ROW  suppliers
(SUPLROW) captures the effects of unilateral liberalization.  As  in the case of our variety
measure,  since it allows for a larger variety of intermediate inputs. we expect a positive and
significant coefficient.  On the other hand, we expect little (or non-significant) variety effect
from our regional analogue measure (SUPLREG) on industrial growth.
As in the case of the import variety measure, we scale our supplier measure with country
specific input-output tables to isolate the complementary  effect of intermediate input variety on
industrial growth (see equation (8) above).
This variety measure has several shortcomings,  including:
The first date of imports does not necessarily signify consistency of available imports
from that source 31. This would mean that we are over-emphasizing  the impact of new inputs on
growth.
This approach - assuming one variety from each country - may bias our results in two
ways.  First, this  simplification will most likely lead to under-counting of the variety of imports
30  If the new imported  goods  are highly  substitutable  to the existing  ones,  the dynamic  growth  impact  will  not be
large. If the new imported  good is not very  substitutable  to  the existing  intermediate  goods,  its dynamic
growth  impact  - AKA  economies  of scale  - will be large,
31 I have  noted  that in looking  at imports  from  Andean  Groups  (especially)  Bolivia. They  tend  to be erratic  and
sporadic  in  many instances.  There  seems  be a degree  of increased  value  and consistency  in imports  from
Bolivia  after 1989  in  many  of the 28 ISIC  industries.
13provided by non-regional suppliers.  For instance, large suppliers like the U.S. will likely supply
multiple varieties of goods to a Colombian industry, whereas regional suppliers supply fewer
varieties. Second, if there is trade diversion from world exports to RIA exports to Colombia, it
will be registered as having a positive dynamic effect on industry level output growth even
though the total number (variety) of intermediate inputs may not have changed or its quality
component may have been reduced.  Our measure is therefore biased in favor of RIA approach
and against the unilateral liberalization policy approach.
B2. The dummy variable.
Our final measure of integration is the literature staple: a dummy variable that captures
the 1991 renewal of the MA.  We define the dummy as:
D=0  upto  1990
D = 1  1991  199432.
We introduce this dummy into the above Caballero and Lyons framework. Equation (3) above
will now become the estimation equations:
(3")  dy,, = a,  + ydxc,,  + Kdx,  +  ±,dTariff  +  D  + [da,  + u,,]
where a,  is a constant; x,, =a,  1,j,  + a2 i1k,, + a3i,M, 33 and [a, + u,] is the error term.  The AD is
an intercept dummy and will capture any shift in the overall level of growth. In the literature a
positive  and  significant  A  is  interpreted  as  a  positive and  significant impact  of  regional
integration arrangement (RIA) on the industrial growth of a member country.
In effect, however, it is difficult to interpret accurately the coefficient on the dummy
variable as the impact of the regional integration if we cannot isolate this impact from other
simultaneously occurring economic events in the countries.  The dummy may be picking up
other influences such as world wide demand shock, productivity shock or major domestic policy
(trade, macro or industrial) changes coinciding with the revival of the RIA.  We control for the
32 Note that for the Andean Pact this renewal is traced back to the Declaration of Ica in 1989,  with free trade
established in 1991. The RIA had a small impact up to the late 1980s. Also note that most cross-country
(cross-sectional) macro analysis include a dummy for the launching of the RIA process.  In our case (panel
data) this is not possible since both agreements  were formed before the starting date of our data.
33 by using the x,, terminology and not directly estimating the coefficients  we lose information about the changes
in the contribution of labor,  material and capital to production. One interesting extension of this exercise
would be to perform this analysis with estimated beta coefficients.
14simultaneous unilateral liberalization by including a proxy in our regressions: a country -specific
34 time series ad-valorem tariff collection
V.  Data and methodology.
The analysis  is  based  on  22  industries 35 and  concentrates on  Bolivia  (1977-1994),
Ecuador (1974-1994) and Colombia 36 (1973-1994). The 3-digit data on the countries' industrial
gross output production, gross fixed capital, number of workers, wages and intermediate inputs
were obtained from United Nations Industrial Development Organization  database. The bilateral
import  data  is  from  COMTRADE United  Nations  database  (see  appendix  3  for  further
information on the data).
For industry level analysis across the three countries of equation (3') and (3"), we rely on
3SLS methodology to account not only for the endogeneity of explanatory  variables, but also for
the potential contemporaneous cross industry correlation of the error terms.  We also correct for
heteroskedasticity.  Here we assume that each of these industries have similar structure across
the three countries. We tested for country specific characteristics. Inclusion of country dummies
did not change the results of our analysis.
Equations (3')  and  (3") were also estimated at the industry level for each country, using
GMM Methodology 37. This estimator provides more information by tapping the lagged level
values as instrumental variables for the first differenced equation. Furthermore, the methodology
allows for the general form of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation providing more efficient
34 The literature has used trade or import  shares, recognizing their limitations and the endogeneity issues attached to
such a use. The use of tariff ad-valorem collections or schedules is considered still considered problematic but
an improvement on use of trade or import shares.  Of course, the series we use is not a full proof proxy for
liberalization. We could only obtain nationwide data on tariff.  This measure therefore also captures the
reduction in regional tariff rates as well.
35  We discarded coal and petroleum (354, 353), leather products (323), other chemical industries (352), non-
ferrous metals (372), and pottery, china, etc.. .(361) for either severe data deficiencies or severe and
implausible changes in data values.
36 Venezuela lacked value added and intermediate input information and a full analysis could not be performed at
present.  We had to discard a study of Peru early on because of significant missing data problems.
37 Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arrellano and Bover (1995) have contributed  to the development  of this
methodology for panel data.
15estimates 38. Using this  methodology will  give  us standard errors  (SE) that  are robust  to
heteroskedasticity (White consistent SE) and auto-correlation.
Finally, we also modeled  a cross-effect between the RIA measures and industry scale
and cross-industry economies of scale 39. In this case, equation (3') becomes:
dy,, =  a, + ydx,, + Kdx,  + r,1REG VARmeasure +  'r,2ROWVARmeasure
±+  g, (REG  VARmeasure  * xj,) + g,2 (ROWVARmeasure  * dx,,)
+ co,  (REGVARmeasure  * x,)  + co2 (ROWVARmeasure  * dx,)
+ [ga,  + u,,]
We  interpret the  , and  c  coefficients on  the  cross-effect terms  as  the  impact  of
integration on economies  of scale (both  within and  across-industries) and  by  extension on
growth. Ceteris paribus 40 41, we expect the,u, s and ct s to be positive and significant.
Throughout our analysis, we used our two alternative variety measures as well as the
dummy variable specification ( seen in equation (3")).
We were mindful of potential heteroskedasticity problems that may arise in a panel data
framework 42 and made the appropriate correction in our analysis.
Capital  services may fluctuate as capacity utilization changes over the business cycle
(Basu and Fernald, 1995; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello, 1996). Since we have capital stock
rather than an accurate measure of capital services we include a proxy to control for changes in
38  Griffiths, et. al. (1993),  pg. 457 point to the  fact that with the GMM, estimators are  consistent, but not
necessarily asymptotically efficient.
39  Harrison (1994) uses a similar set up for her analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on firm behavior in
Cote d'lvoire.
4" According to the literature, assuming  the dummy is capturing an active regionalism effort, both p,i and  2) would
be  positive and  significant:  regionalism enhances industry scale economies through  agglomeration  and cross-
industry externality through market expansion.
41 we are not comparing to unilateral liberalization.
42 We used Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity  tests to diagnose this problem.  We also acknowledge that Judge et.
al. (1985) warn about the weaknesses of such tests by pointing out that White's test significance may be
indicating mis-specificiation (omitted  variables or incorrect functional  form) rather than heteroskedasticity.  In
our early IV analysis, our results were always heteroskedasticity  corrected using the white method. The GMM
takes into account a general form of heteroskedasticity.
16capacity  utilization.  Following  precedence  in  the  literature,  we  use  country  specific
manufacturing level electricity utilization over the period 1971-1994 in both equations (3) and
(6). Harisson (1994) uses a measure of total energy use while Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
43 (1995) use electricity use as proxy
In order to avoid the effects of non-stationarity typically present in this type of data, we
first differenced all the variables 44. However, using first differenced variables is not without its
shortcomings. We lose the cross-industry dimension of our data.  Also, first differencing  is
criticized for a tendency to emphasize measurement errors (or noise) over signal. This decreases
the signal to noise ratio and raises the possibility  of poor precision in estimation.
An issue of serious concern is the endogeneity  of some of the explanatory  variables.  The
solution should be to instrument these variables. However, the use of this methodology has been
questioned on two grounds. Hall (1998) highlights the first problem with using instruments: lack
of truly exogeneous instruments that are highly correlated with the endogenous variable and not
with the error term.  Among the instruments Hall, the one with the highest correlation wvith  the
endogenous variables is the price of oil.  It is also the most questionable instrument, because of
the possibility that technical progress is not Hicks-neutral 45. The second difficulty is that poorly
fitting instrumental variables may lead to substantial small-sample bias 46.
43 They reference Griliches & Jorgenson, 1967 and Costello, 1993 for precedence. Studying capacity  utilization and
returns to scale, they find constant returns to scale. They conclude that "their results strongly supports models
which emphasize cyclical movements in capacity utilization rates as an important  determinant  of movements in
conventional measures of total factor and labor productivity" (pp. 105).
44 This is a common practice in the literature. We tested for non-stationarity using the Dickey-Fuller  test at the
industry and country levels. We find that an overwhelming  number of series have unit roots. We test for
cointegration and find that again a large number of the relationships have unit roots and can't be used in levels.
We check for the presence of autocorrelation for the industry level data and find it present. In the presence of
autocorrelation  our LS coefficients will be unbiased but not efficient. The covariance matrix will be biased and the
standard errors and consequent interval estimates and hypothesis  tests will be invalid.
45 In  her research on Cote d'lvoire,  Harrison (1994) argues that the OLS (fixed effects) and IV results are  not
qualitatively different.  She bases her assessment on the  Hausman test and the  over-identification test  results.
Caballero and Lyons (1990) also point out that while Hall's concern about specification errors are warranted, the
lack of good macro-instruments made the instrumental variable procedure powerless.  They note that the reason for
our  concern over  specification  error  is  our  interest  in  consistent parameter  estimates.  They argue  that  the
inconsistency in coefficient estimates is small if the size of thc variance of the regressors relative to their covariance
with changes in productivity growth is small.  In this case, there would be no need to give up on the least square
approach
46 Here Basu and Fernald (1995) refer to Nelson and Startz (1990).
17We attempted several alternative sets of instrumental variables based on the ones used by
Harrison  (1994),  Hall  (1988)  and  Bumside  (1996)47. We  also  tried  the  Anderson-Hsiao
methodology: using one or more lagged log level of the endogenous variables as instruments for
their corresponding first differenced values. Tests of over-identifying restrictions suggested that
our  instrument sets were  generally valid 48. That is  there  was no  correlation between  the
instruments and the error term.  However, these variables violated another major requirement for
good instruments: relevance.  Their correlations  with the endogenous variables were rather low 49.
We use the most promising set:  the Anderson-Hsiao  instruments.
VI.  Results and Policy Implications
Results associated with the regressions on the dummy variable/import tariffs specification
(specification  (3"'))  matched  those  prevalent in  the  literature:  the  dummy  variable  was
insignificant, signaling that RIAs do not have an impact on growth in member countries.  The
5Q results are not reported here
For the sake of brevity, we do not present and discuss every step and detail of each
country's  econometric results,  although we will refer to  them in  the overall analysis 51 and
provide an overview in table 3.  Table 2  reports the results of the 3SLS heteroskedasticity and
auto-correlation corrected results for each industry across the three countries related to equation
(3").  The log difference of real output is the dependent variable.  The table  includes terms
47 Harrison uses log of nominal exchange rates, log of price index for energy, the log of sectoral wages and the log
of debt. Based on her work we use:  log of nominal exchange rates log of price of oil and manufacturing
sector wages.  Burnside (1996) analyses and ranks 5 alternative instrument sets. We tried one of the better
perforrning and higher ranked ones: the current and three lagged values of growth rate of world oil price.
However, as Hall points out, this instrument  set is suspicious. Other instrument  sets Burnside suggests
(including Hall's) were not available for the set of country in our study.
48  Note however that this test is actually a joint null hypothesis of correct model specification  and validity of the
instrument  matrix (Davidson & Mackinnon, 1993).
49  The results obtained from these IV exercise involving Burnside's and Harrison's were mixed and non-robust.
Equation (4) coefficient estimates (especially those of within-industry scale) tended to vary greatly without being
significant (or significantly different from I in the case of the scale term). Burnside (1996) points out that this may
be due to the high correlation between aggregate IVs and the external economy term.  He recommends use of more
industry specific lVs, which in our case are not available consistently across three countries.
50 But are available from the author upon request.
51  These results are available from the author upon request
18capturing industry and cross-industry scales, and electricity as a proxy for capacity utilization. It
also contains alternative measures for regional integration  and unilateral liberalization.
Panels two  and three of table  two provide several insights and we  draw three main
conclusions.
Our first set of conclusions is related to the industry level scales. We find that the scale
coefficients range from 0.693 to  1.412 and are significantly different from zero, supporting
Burnside (1996) 's argument that there is significant heterogeneity among the industries 52. The
heterogeneity of  industry level  economies of scale was confirmed by  the country specific
analysis 53. Therefore, the benefits of regional integration touted by the theoretical literature may
only  accrue  to  a  select number of industries.  Country-industry specific  analysis (table  3)
supports this aggregate analysis.
We verify that when cross industry scales are significant, they are so for a handful of
industries (tobacco, industrial chemicals, etc,...).  However, even when significant,  they are
very small and negative. Country-industry specific level analysis supports this result' 4. Our
results  contradict those of Caballero and Lyons (1990) who find the high and consistent positive
output spillovers across industries for two out of the four countries in their study and in their
1992 study on U.S. manufacturing.  On the other hand, the estimates match Basu and Femald's
(1995) work where they re-appraise Caballero and Lyons' 1992 analysis, correcting it for the use
of value added data and the assumption of perfect competition. Basu and Fernald find that
across-industry scale is negative, and in the scale of  0.02 to 0.035.  Our aggregate estimates
range from  0.0002 to  0.0337.  Our country-industry specific industry  (reported in table  3)
support our aggregate analysis.
The final set of results addresses the impact of intermediate import variety on output
growth.  Our variety measures are positive and significant  for only a  few industries. Second, the
effect of imported intermediate input variety (measured either by change in number of suppliers
or growth in import variety) is industry specific and small (all but one case have a coefficient
smaller than one).  A one percent change in intermediate variety will generally lead to less than
one percent growth in industry specific growth.  This is reassuring since we did not expect very
52  A large number of them are also significantly different than l.
53  Here, the coefficients' range was wider, but heterogeneity was definitely and significantly present.
54 See footnote 50.
19large effects given the fact that variety impacts are second order effects.  Also, not all industries
should be affected (or affected equally) by imported intermediate input varieties. Third, there is
weak evidence that when the ROW variety measures are significant, they are positive two thirds
of the time.  The results for the regional varieties in panels two and three are much weaker,
possibly signaling non-relevance of regional varieties of intermediate inputs to  member country
industrial growth.
More dis-aggregated country and industry specific analysis (see  summary in table 3)
points to differentiated performance across the three Andean countries, nonetheless supporting
the more widespread positive influence of unilateral liberalization. For instance, in Ecuador
changes in ROW varieties have positive impact on 8 out of 19 industries, concentrated mostly on
industries using intermediate inputs.  While less evident in Colombia, ROW varieties affect
three  industries  that  depend  on  intermediate  inputs  (e.g.  electrical  machinery,  transport
equipment). On the other hand, the impact of the unilateral liberalization is not as strongly
captured in  Bolivia.  We can not  detect a  pattern in  our results  favoring industries using
intermediate inputs.  The effects of regional varieties - when significantly present as in the case
of Colombia - are generally negative and concentrated in the more basic industries such as food
and tobacco.
Finally, we also estimated equation (3"')  to capture the cross-effect regional revival and
unilateral liberalization may have on within and cross-industry externality. This last exercise did
not net us much insight.  In general cross-effect terms were very small and non-significant. One
obvious reason for this set of results is the built-in multi-collinearity between cross-effect and
original terms.
VI.  Policy  Implications  and Future Research.
The three Andean Countries in our study have very small, negative external economies.
These results reject the argument proposed by Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992) that large
positive externalities exist at the industrial level. I also find that there is significant heterogeneity
in within  industry  externalities.  The combination of  these two  results  casts doubt  on the
argument that countries may benefit  from RIA because of industry and cross-industry scale
effects.  In fact, a handful of industries may benefit from industry scale effects, but no cross-
20industry effects appear present in the sense intended by the theoretical literature.  Country-
industry specific analysis lends support to this conclusion.
With  regards to our capturing the impact of the revival of the Andean Pact - while
controlling for the simultaneous unilateral liberalization its members implemented - via the
imported intermediate input variety channel we obtain mixed results.
At the cross country level (table 2, panels one and two) our variety measures have a
significant impact on a handful of industries' growth.  Within this set, ROW variety measures
seem to have a generally  positive impact on industrial output. This lends preliminary support to
our argument that unilateral liberalization will have positive impact on output growth via the
imported intermediate input channel.  Our regional variety has much more of a mixed impact,
potentially supporting the argument that we should not expect a noticeable impact of variety on
industrial growth within a South-South arrangement. Country specific analysis (table 3) lends
general support to our assessment.
A potential avenue for further investigation lies in further refining our import variety
measures to provide us with more insightful results.  The variety series here were calculated on a
rather aggregate 3-digit ISIC level.  We hope to  replicate this analysis using four-digit SITC
(commodity  based).  This dis-aggregation  will capture more variations in our variety measures.
21Table 1:  Mean and Standard Deviation of Supplier and Variety Series by Country:
Regional  Regional  Non-  Growth  Growth
Bolivia  suppliers  suppliers  regional  in  in Non-
Supplier  Regional  regional
__________  ~~~~~variety  __  _  _  _  _  variety  _  _  _  _  _
Mean  Std Dev.  Initial  Final  Mean  Std. Dev  Initial  Final  Mean  Std Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev
number*  number  number  number
I  Food products  3.615  0.6373  4  4  30.5  4.71  30  32  0.0007  0.004  -0.0006  0.0203
2  Beverages  3.423  0.7027  3  4  24.92  4.68  22  27  -0.003  0.023  0.0044  0.0347
3 Tobacco  2.231  0.9923  3  4  17.65  3.03  16  18  -0.006  0.037  0.0192  0.1532
4  Textiles  0.077  0.2717  0  0  7.115  2.21  10  8  0.0  0.0  0.0197  0.1866
5  Wearing apparel  3.653  0.6288  4  4  36.769  4.25  33  45  -0.0004  0.033  0.0059  0.0334
6  Footwear  1.884  1.3384  2  4  13.846  4.04  9  21  0.0080  0.027  -0.0839  0.4128
7 Wood prods  2.269  1.2824  4  3  1115  4.89  8  23  0.0000  0.022  0.0515  0.2148
8 Furniture  2.384  1.0228  2  3  17.269  3.03  14  18  -0.0770  0.408  -0.0152  0.1272
9  Paper and prods  3.000  0.8944  3  4  25.653  4.02  25  32  0.0514  0.186  -0.0021  0.0238
10 Printing and pub  3.962  0.1961  4  4  36.462  7.08  26  38  -0.0088  0.052  0.0116  0.0684
11 Industrial chems  3.538  0.6467  4  4  38  5.72  31  46  -0.0006  0.007  0.0028  0.0153
12 Rubber prods  3.385  0.7524  2  4  29.462  3.58  29  32  -0.0332  0.407  -0.0017  0.0170
13 Plastic prods  3.461  0.8114  3  4  27.346  5.78  23  38  -0.0045  0.037  0.0041  0.0248
14 Glass prods  3.423  0.7027  3  4  26.307  3.27  22  30  0.0089  0.052  -0.0041  0.0280
15 Other non-metallic  2.269  0.7243  2  3  21.615  3.83  20  21  -0.0001  0.005  0.0040  0.1705
16  Iron andsteel  2.5  0.9055  2  4  27.038  3.29  23  31  0.0018  0.016  0.0023  0.0165
17 Fab.  Metal prods  3.961  0.1961  4  4  43.846  7.49  24  58  -0.0002  0.001  -0.0023  0.0240
18 Machinery etc. elec  3.961  0.1961  4  4  45.769  6.87  38  64  -0.0042  0.023  0.0037  0.0197
19 Machinery  clec.  3.962  0.1961  4  4  42.192  6.62  38  52  0.0014  0.007  0.0058  0.0458
2(1 l ransport  c(quip.  3.769  0.4297  3  4  .19.6()2  7.58  32  52  0.0233  ().115  -0.0032  0.0227
21 P'rof  and scientific  3.615  (0.6970(  4  4  34.538  5.54  27  4.3  0.0489  (0.2310  -(.(043  0.012(3
22  Other manuf. prods  3.769  0.5870  4  4  3 1.730  5.34  27  38  0.0121  0.113  0.0038  0.0203
Data for initial year is 1972.  Final year is 1995
22Table I - continued
Regional  Non-  Growth  Growth
Colombia  suppliers  regional  in  in Non-
Supplier  Regional  regional
variety  variety
Mean  Std Dev.  Initial  Final  Mean  Std. Dev  Initial  Final  Mean  Std Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev
number*  number  number  number
1 Food products  3.269  0.452  3  4  37.038  9.463  28  61  0.00045  0.00227  -0.0157  0.0899
2  Beverages  2.846  0.543  3  4  33.385  9.130  22  48  -0.00053  0.01875  -0.0048  0.0342
3 Tobacco  3.038  0.662  2  4  23.769  4.860  23  29  0.0040  0.1866  -0.0011  0.1492
4  Textiles  1.455  0.820  2  4.4231  2.003  3  5  0.1620  0.4595  0.0383  0.1911
5  Wearing apparel  2.769  0.863  1  4  41.077  14.65  29  66  0.1002  0.3848  0.0100  0.0256
6  Footwear  1,913  1.164  _  4  20.384  9.047  16  42  0.0844  0.2775  0.0087  0.1740
7 Woodprods  1.684  1.157  4  12.923  10.714  4  41  0.0010  0.1381  0.0361  0.1099
8 Furniture  2.333  1.007  1  4  26.461  10.206  19  52  0.0195  0.7755  -0.0148  0.0673
9  Paper and prods  2.307  0.837  2  4  32.846  7.035  28  53  0.1269  0.7844  -0.0042  0.0242
10 Printing and pub  3.154  0.464  4  4  35.116  9.643  26  60  -0.005  0.0698  0.0040  0.0127
11 Industrial chems  3.500  0.510  3  3  57.231  15.822  40  83  0.0002  0.0008  -0.0006  0.0112
12 Rubber prods  2.640  0.907  1  3  38.538  10.045  23  61  0.0179  0.2340  0.0012  0.0118
13 Plastic  prods  2.154  0.967  1  3  31.115  14.406  24  66  -0.1401  0.9314  -0.0107  0.0540
14 Glass prods  2.308  0.617  2  3  29.692  8.2061  24  49  -0.0131  0.1694  0.0082  0.0312
15 Other non-metallic  2.320  0.802  1  4  31.038  8.3975  23  50  0.0343  0.1496  0.0023  0.0114
16 Iron and steel  2.577  0.809  1  3  40.500  9.1356  29  56  0.0314  0.1692  -0.0004  0.0103
17 Fab. Metal prods  3.346  0.562  3  4  49.538  13.139  35  79  0.0028  0.0123  0.0021  0.0257
18 Machinery etc. elec  3.615  0.571  3  4  60.500  15.518  43  94  0.0075  0.0298  -0.0008  0.0145
19 Machinery  elec.  3.191  0.491  3  4  52.691  14.385  35  88  0.0002  0.0037  -0.0033  0.0327
20 Transport  equip.  3.423  0.504  3  3  50.115  12.729  35  81  0.0001  0.0015  -0.0032  0.0179
21 Prof and scientific  2.692  0.838  1  3  46.38  9.826  35  65  0.1004  0.5821  0.0016  0.0121
22  Other manuf. prods  3.038  0.445  2  3  36.269  10.697  25  56  -0.0041  0.0544  -0.0076  0.0279
Data for initial year is 1972. Final year is 1995.
23Table I - continued
Regional  Non-  Growth  Growth
Ecuador  suppliers  regional  in  in Non-
Supplier  Regional  regional
variety  variety
Mean  Std Dev.  Initial  Final  Mean  Std. Dev  Initial  Final  Mean  Std Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev
number*  number  number  number
I Food products  2.538  0.706  2  4  28.846  4.360  26  32  0.0288  0.211  0.0130  0.1187
2 Beverages  2.461  0.647  3  3  28.731  5.126  25  35  0.0037  0.171  0.0088  0.0375
3 Tobacco  1.800  0.768  1  3  21.461  4.966  17  30  0.0196  0.944  -0.005  0.0673
4 Textiles  1.333  0.577  1  2.647  0.996  3  2  -2.332  0.1368  0.7355
5 Wearing apparel  2.731  0.667  2  4  35.076  4.326  36  47  -0.0019  0.0044  -0.0037  0.0155
6 Footwear  1.909  1.221  . 4  11.192  4.578  10  23  -0.0369  0.1172  0.0471  0.2670
7 Wood prods  1.500  0.759  . 3  7.520  7.030  1  25  0.0968  0.2817  0.0138  1.0251
8 Furniture  2.125  0.992  1  3  19.500  3.870  13  26  -0.0178  0.5773  0.0012  0.0593
9 Paper and prods  2.692  0.471  2  3  27.801  3.710  25  39  -0.0098  0.0507  0.0006  0.0150
10 Printingandpub  3.385  0.571  3  4  33.153  7.259  30  47  0.0097  0.0617  -0.0068  0.0398
11 Industrial  chems  3.038  0.196  3  3  49.462  5.743  41  57  0.0000  0.0017  0.0016  0.0139
12 Rubber  prods  2.577  0.504  2  3  34.577  4.709  29  40  0.0025  0.0190  0.0037  0.0284
13 Plastic  prods  2.885  0.516  3  4  32.384  5.352  24  46  0.0024  0.0112  0.0123  0.0577
14 Glass prods  2.577  0.643  2  4  28.846  3.812  24  39  0.0002  0.0006  0.0029  0.0248
15 Other  non-metallic  2.769  0.430  3  3  27.885  4.082  20  34  0.0022  0.0161  -0.0135  0.1443
16 Iron  and steel  2.962  0.528  1  3  32.308  3.947  28  38  -0.0184  0.2996  0.0127  0.0910
17 Fab. Metalprods  3.346  0.562  3  4  44.115  5.022  39  54  0.0022  0.0143  0.0091  0.0305
18 Machinery  etc.  3.615  0.496  3  4  51.385  7.829  40  66  -0.0008  0.0053  0.0067  0.0423
non- elec
19 Machinery  elec.  3.346  0.562  3  4  43.962  6.069  38  49  -0.0010  0.0106  -0.0083  0.0253
20 Transport  equip.  3.269  0.604  4  4  41.269  7.492  29  52  -0.0012  0.0288  -0.0008  0.0195
21 Prof and scientific  2.962  0.720  2  3  39.038  4.565  32  43  0.01311  0.0736  0.0070  0.0584
22  Other  manuf. prods  2.769  0.710  3  4  32.769  5.085  30  45  0.0047  0.0336  0.0110  0.0597
Data for initial year is 1972. Final year is 1995
24Table  2: Andean  Pact Industry  specific  results.
Panel 1 - regional and ROW  variety  change
y,, = a,  + y1x,, + KjX,  + yt'Electricity  + q,VARROW(-1)  + 0,VARREG(-1)
+[4~a,  +u,,]
INDUSTRY  CROSS-IND  ELEC  ROW  REG
INDUSTRY  SCALE  SCALE  VARIETY  (-1)  VARIETY  (-1)
I  Food products  0.9360  -0.0015  0.2182  -0.3146  -0.07405
15.76  0.33  2.94  288  2.93
2  Beverages  0.7815  0.0022  -0.1820  -0.4434  -0.0378
8.07  0.27  1.47  1.51  1.26
3  Tobacco  0.8968  0.0443  -0.0456  0.0059  -0.0510
I.L15  3.04  0.21  0.02  0.54
4  Textiles  1.2598  -0.0092  0.0444  0.0082
16.61  2.06  0.68  0.34
5  Wearing  apparel  1.1699  -0.0095  0.0700  -0.0011  -0.0545
26.23  1.42  0.71  0.033  1.43
6  Footwear  1.3680  -0.0062  0.2037  0.0398  -0.0799
31.84  0.64  1.32  0.56  0.89
7  Wood  prods  0.9567  -0.0001  -0.1593  0.0147  -0.0115
14.45  0.018  1.90  0.69  1.06
8  Furniture  1.0218  0.0024  -0.1674  -0.0116  0.  0276
18.66  0.43  2.10  0.63  2.04
9  Paper and prods  0.9918  -0.0066  -0.0133  -0.2091  0.0478
22.40  1.06  0.14  0.64  1.69
10  Printing and pub  1.0696  -0.0029  -0.1347  0.7104  -0.0078
17.04  0.56  1.69  2.81  0.36
11  Industrial chems  1.2227  -0.017  7  0.0739  -0.6799  0.0187
25.25  1.80  0.50  1.30  0.33
12  Rubber prods  1.2415  -0.0125  -0.0853  -0.5292  0.0011
58.85  1.86  0.91  1.53  0.03
13  Plastic prods  1.046)  0.0092  -0.1515  -0.0989  0.0399
17.17  1.63  1.84  0.31  0.97
14  Glass prods  1.3052  -0.0586  0.1860  1.1472  -0.1509
22.88  5.78  1.21  3.61  2.16
15  Other non-metallic  1.1402  0.0046  -0.0246  0.1772  -0.2337
11.39  0.71  0.26  0.82  4.97
16  Iron and steel  1.1972  -0.0135  0.1577  -0.1360  -0.1276
19.58  1.23  0.98  0.23  0.92
17  Fab.  Metal prods  L.2333  -0.0162  0.0182  -0.0002  -0.0336
31.29  3.57  0.31  0.006  1.03
18  Machinery etc.  1.3842  0.0064  -0.3559  -0.09870  -0.1451
Non-elec  26.10  0.48  1.84  1.25  1.57
19  Machinery elec.  1.0570  0.0022  0.0217  0.4240  -0.1321
1&53  0.35  0.24  2.35  1.26
20  Transport  equip.  1.2063  -0.0063  -0.0352  -0.0893  -0.0599
_  __________________  28.49  0.84  0.33  1.51  1.08
21  Prof and scientific  1.3001  -0.0161  -0.0230  0.2424  -0.1681
_____  __________  ____  22.01  1.56  -0.15  0.63  1.90
22  Other manuf. prods  1.1577  0.0131  0.2866  0.6658  0.0226
__________  _________  39.57  1.37  Z01  2.49  0.33
T -stats  in second line of each box. Regression  results In log first differences-  dependent  variable is log
difference of real output.
25Table  2: Andean  Pact  Industry  specific  results
Panel 2 - regional and ROW  suppliers
Yj, =  Ra,  + y,x,,  + Kjx,  + igjElectricity  + q,SUPLROW(-1) + 0,SUPLREG(-1)
+[4a, +u,  ,,]
INDUSTRY  CROSS-IND  ELEC  ROW  REG
INDUSTRY  SCALE  SCALE  SUPPLIER(-1)  SUPPLIER  (-1)
I  Food products  0.9184  -0.0010  0.2393  -0.0211  -0.1948
17.17  0.22  3.33  0.34  5.69
2  Beverages  0.6927  0.0034  -0.1879  -0.2851  0.1465
6.23  0.43  1.56  2.54  2.19
3  Tobacco  0.9404  0.0300  -0.027  0.1371  -0.0071
11.10  2.03  0.13  0.82  0.07
4  Textiles  1.2905  -0.0093  0.0377  -0.0824
16.62  2.06  0.57  0.13
5  Wearing apparel  1.1350  -0.0014  0.0924  -0.3373  -0.0345
24.67  0.22  0.99  3.56  0.63
6  Footwear  1.4061  -0.0083  0.1614  -0.0647  0.0399
33.34  0.84  1.05  0.35  0.35
7  Wood prods  0.9072  -0.0021  -0.1810  0.1226  0.0332
15.64  0.35  2.24  2.23  1.31
8  Furniture  1.008  0.0075  -0.1  751  0.0237  -0.439
17.10  1.27  2.25  0.44  1.69
9  Paper and prods  0.9662  -0.0082  -0.0299  0.1332  -0.4069
20.76  1.32  0.34  1.21  0.61
10  Printing and pub  1.0345  -0.0052  -0.0537  0.1621  0.1169
16.35  1.03  0.76  2.04  2.33
11  Industrial  chems  1.1806  -0.0199  0.0681  -0.0241  0.2378
21.72  2.04  0.48  0.10  1.58
12  Rubber prods  1.2650  -0.0177  -0.0782  0.0722  -0.0609
58.29  2.62  0.84  0.50  0.61
13  Plastic prods  1.0286  0.0089  -0.1520  0.0463  -0.1603
16.57  1.63  1.91  0.39  2.37
14  Glass prods  1.2496  -0.0424  -0.0424  -0.5550  -0.0237
18.89  4.10  1.69  2.60  0.18
15  Other non-metallic  0.9869  0.0030  0.0035  0.3552  0.0895
8.84  0.43  0.04  2.42  1.01
16  Iron and steel  1.2402  -0.0181  0.1531  0.2594  -o.0019
18.50  1.64  0.95  1.17  0.024
17  Fab.  Metal prods  1.2215  -0.0156  0.0156  0.0566  -0.0486
26.19  3.27  0.17  0.76  1.28
18  Machinery etc. elec  1.4122  0.0089  -0.3511  -0.2627  -0.2527
27.18  0.68  1.84  1.26  2.50
19  Machinery  elec.  1.0263  0.0049  0.0603  -0.1691  0.0344
17.41  0.76  0.67  1.69  0.50
20  Transport equip.  1.1783  -0.0037  -0.0444  -0.1888  0.0013
28.84  0.49  0.42  1.26  0.013
21  Prof and scientific  1.3258  -0.0168  -0.0297  0.1483  -0.3415
22.28  1.62  0.20  0.68  2.31
22  Other manuf. prods  1.1343  0.0086  0.3018  0.4836  -0.0638
38.18  0.91  2.17  2.90  0.64
T -stats  in second  line of each box.  Regression  results  In log  first differences-  dependent  variable  is  log  difference  of
real output.
26Table  3: Summary  of Country  specific  results-  Regional and ROW  variety change
Yi, = a,  + 7ix, 1 + Kjx,  +  yi,Electricity  + q,VARROW(-1) + 0,VARREG(-1)
+ [ga, + u1 ,]
INDUSTRY  CROSS-IND  ELEC  ROW  REG
COUNTRY  SCALE  SCALE  VARIETY  (-1)  VARIETY  (-1)
Bolivia  19 industries with  5 industries have  7 industries have  5 industries; no  2 industries
significant coeffs:  very small,  significant  coeffs,  apparent
DRS:7  positive and  four of them  concentration in
CRS:2  significant coeffs.  negative.  industries using
IRS:.10  intermediate
._______________  inputs.
Colombia  14 industries  5 industries have  7 industries have  4 industries  8 industies
significant coeffs:  significant coeffs,  signifi  cant coeffs,  (3positive:  (6 negative: food,
DRS:  I  all very small, 4 of  5 are positive.  Other non-  tobacco,  paper
CRS:  0  them negative.  metallic prods,  prods, iron and
IRS:  13  Machinery elec.  steel,  fabricated
And transport  metalproducts)
equipment)
Ecuador  19 industries  3 industries have  5 industries have  8 industries;  2 industries
significant  very small  significant coeffs,  Concentration in
coeffs::  negative and  one of them  industries
DRS:  8  significant  coeffs.  negative.  traditionally using
CRS: 4  intermediate
IRS:  7  inputs (15, 16, 17,
____________  18, 20, 21)
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31Appendix 1
The Caballero-Lyons  Model
Within the growth framework, Caballero and Lyons (1990) extend on the work by Solow
(1956) and Hall (1988, 1990) to  investigate the presence of internal versus external economies
of scale.
Empirically, for each industry i we start with an "augmented" growth equation where the
impact of external economy is specifically represented by  E,.  All  other variables have been
described above: Yi,  = Ai,  .f(K,,  L,, E, )). We also assume that the function is homogeneous of
degree  y  (HOD y)  in  capital (K,,)  and labor (L, ) while HOD 1 in  Ej, and  A,,.  So that,
equation (1) is now transformed into:
(1)  dyi, = r[a ,,1dl,  + a i,k  dk,, I  + de, + da,  or
(2)  dyj, =  ydx,  + (de  ,  + da , )
where  dxj, =fa,,1 dl,  + a kdk,  I  and ai,,,,a uk  are cost shares of  labor and capital. y  represents
internal (within industry) economies of scale (here , and for the moment, we constrain y to be
the same for all industries)  da,,  is productivity (TFP)  index.  de,,  represents the external
economy (cross-industry) index and can be represented by any simple form depicting the source
of externalities postulated.  Here, we choose a simple linear form as:
(3)  de,, = Jidy,  + duj,
32du,, is the error term and  y,  is the aggregate (manufacturing sector) output.  Plugging (3) into
(2):
(4)  dy 1, = ydx  j, +  /dy,  + da j, + du,
If we aggregated equation (4) over all industries i , we would get:
(5)  dy, =  dx, +  I  da,
where dx, =  E  dx, . At the aggregate level, equation (5) shows more than just internal (within
industry) economies.  The stronger the presence of cross-industry externality (i.e. the larger f,),
the more the OLS estimates of r will be biased upward. Plugging (5) back into (4) we obtain:
(6)  dy  j, =ydxj, +  dx, +  I  da, +du,,
1  -fl  1  -fl
C&B (1990) use equations (2a) and (6)  to disentangle the presence and significance of internal
versus external economies of scale.
In estimating equation (2a) we need to take into consideration  that the industry level and
aggregate level inputs  (dx1, and dx,)  will be positively correlated.  In the presence of external
effects, therefore, the estimated coefficient in equation (2a) , called  9  from now on, will be
upward biased. In fact, according to Caballero and Lyons (1990),
33(7)  plim  = y +  V  , where  tV  =  dx'dx.
07dx;
b.  Using equation (6) they  estimate the coefficients y and  Y  and deduce ,6.  They
also obtain an estimate for 9  and proceed to compare these coefficients in order to identify the
impact (or lack thereof) of within vs. external economies of scale 55.
55 Prior to introducing RIA proxies, we will briefly look at the existence of internal vs. external effects at the
manufacturing as well as industry level (for each country). We are fully aware that this partial analysis will only
provide us with biased results (since the equation is mis-specified),  we however undertake it for illustrative reasons.
More specifically, we will proceed in sequential  form in answering the following questions by estimating
the above equations:
1. Do economies of scale (EOS) exist? For which countries,  which industries?
2.  Is this economies of scale within industries or across industries? In other words, what are the values of
the coefficients r  and  B ?
3.  If we find significant economies  of scale (either w/in or across), we need to consider alternative
hypotheses (explanation/correlations)  that may cause this result..
For instance, Abbot, Griliches and Hausman  (1989) find that when they include capacity utilization, Hall's (1988)
mark-up loses its significance. We therefore need to verify the sensitivity of our analysis to alternative
specifications.
4.  Analysis of the results will following outline:
* Existence of cross-industry externality should benefit these nations for it increases  production efficiency.
* If there is no with-in industry externality then developing countries adhering to an RIA will not
experience large agglomeration benefits  suggested by the theoretical and simulation literature. This would
raise questions about the value of integration (Caballero and Lyons, 1990).
34Appendix 2
Theoretical Framework
This  appendix  addresses two  issues.  In  part one,  we  outline  a  new  growth  model  that
incorporates intermediate inputs/imports flow as carriers of foreign knowledge.  It delineates
how regionalism vs. open regionalism may affect this flow and by extension domestic industrial
growth.  In part two, it briefly discusses how the intermediate input/imports flow may affect
within and cross-industry externality.
By definition regional integration arrangements (RIA) are preferential agreements and
will discriminate against non-members.  This discrimination is represented through differential
tariff rates, market access, human capital and labor movements, and a host of other privileges.
The literature identifies three avenues for the RIA to affect the member economies: the
redundancy, allocation and  scale  effects.  The redundancy effect  addresses the process  of
eliminating duplicative research and the gains from it. The allocation effect addresses the within
(and cross) country resources allocation due to  regional integration.  Movements of  human
capital to  (away) the R&D sector leads to  increase (decrease) in the creation/production of
knowledge domestically and to faster (slower) growth.  Finally, the scale effect addresses the
impact of an RIA on the incentives and dynamics of the R&D sector (which here produces
intermediate sector), and by extension the growth of the economy (see Walz, 1997).
For simplicity, we assume the absence of redundancies and abstract from allocation
effects. We investigate the scale effect.
We use the framework of a new growth theory model to understand better the impact of a
RIA on the growth of its members' industrial sector. We do not present a full fledge model here,
rather, only state the aspects of the model we consider most relevant to our empirical analysis
35and hypothesis testing discussed in the main text.  For instance, we abstract from stating and
analyzing the full equilibriun and steady state conditions. Rivera-Batiz et. al. (1991, 1992), Puga
and Venables (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapters 3, 9 and 11) and Ruhashyankiko
(1997) provide full model analyzes (though with different basic assumptions).
We have opted for model qualifications that match  the two regional  agreements of
interest. Theoretical abstractions were however unavoidable  to make the analysis tractable.
Part I. The outline of the growth model
We assume a three-country model: two symmetric "southern" countries and a larger third
comprising the rest of the world (ROW). The southern countries have comparative advantage in
labor intensive production compared to the ROW, though still endowed with small R&D sectors.
They  have similar economic structures, endowments and capital to labor ratios. Their identical
capital to labor ratio is less than that of ROW.  They innovate in the sense that a share of their
new intermediate goods is truly original, while the rest is based on de-assembling and altering
the design of imported intermediate inputs (imitation, copying, re-engineering). Hence the flow
of new intermediate inputs from ROW, or in other words, the pool of knowledge provided by
ROW, is essential for the long term growth of the R&D sector and by extension the economy.
We assume a South-South or customs union arrangement 56. While there are no internal
tariffs to  trade, a  common external tariff  exists.  There  are free human capital  and  labor
56 We assume a customs union framework rather a common market set-up. In a common market, movement of
factors of production allows the reallocation effect regional integration to kick in.  However, the regional
arrangements we are studying belie this theoretical set up now. Since we hope to develop empirically  testable
hypotheses, we opted for the framework (customs union) which is closer to the reality of the Andean Group.
Even after agreeing to a common external tariff in 1994,  the Andean Group diverges enough from a traditional
CU that we can view it as a Free Trade Area: not all members are complying with the CU (Bolivia, Peru),
there are still some protected industries in each country.
36movements  within countries but  not  across countries. Assume also  that  interest  rates are
determined by world markets and are equalized across the world due to arbitrage.
We also assume a  two-sector model, one sector producing final goods and the other
creating and producing intermediate goods (called R&D sector for simplicity).  That is in the
R&D sector innovators also produce the intermediate goods 57.
The typical representative household maximizes its inter-temporal utility over a freely
traded final good Y:
(1)  UT =  Je  p(T)  ln Y(t)dt
T
Where p  is the discount rate.  We assume that interest rates r are set internationally so that
p=r.
We conceptualize that the dynamic effects of  the RIA are channeled through the trade in
differentiated intermediate goods.  That is, trade is our vehicle for transfer of the knowledge
essential to insure dynamic (long-term) growth via its role in creation of new input.
The underlying production function for final good industry Y in  country i is:
(2)  Y=(Hy  )  (L,)6fxj(j)  dj
HY and Ly  are the factor inputs used to produce the final good Y. x, (j)  is the intermediate good
from country j  and used  in country i  (note that we can have  i = j).  a  > 1  as elasticity of
58 substitution between two intermediate inputs
57  In combining the innovation and production of intermediate  goods, we have circumvented a whole set of
economic relationships such as decisions about the manner, and timing of  payments on intellectual  property
and pattern rights.  This abstraction was done to simplify the analysis.  Rivera and Romer (1991) state that
such an "institutional structure" supports a decentralized equilibrium  in manufacturing.
37The intermediate good production is knowledge driven. In each southern country i, we
assume the creation of intermediate goods in each industrial sector Z is a general function of
human capital invested in its innovation (Hx) and the public pool of knowledge represented here
by the number of overall available intermediate (N):
(3)  x:  = f(H>,  N)
such that the dynamic growth of intermediate inputs is detennined by:
(4)  xz = (Hx )N
and will continue to grow in each industry Z while:
(5)  z  2
xN
where  X, is discounted profits for producers/creators  of intermediate inputs.  WH / N  is cost of
innovation, with W'  as wages (paid to human capital). The cost of innovation will decrease with
the increased variety of intermediate goods N.  We define N as59
(6)  N = f  (Nhom  ,  N PlApaner X  NROW
58)a  jd The production  function  is more  typically  written  as: Y=(H,)a(Lr)bx,()dj]  , where
a  ,  and-=  , with elasticity of substitution  as:  a  =
ar  a  a-i  1--a
59 Note that here we assume that  knowledge brought in via intermediate inputs affects innovation in all industries
equally.  In other words, it enlarges the domestic pool of knowledge.  Alternatively, we can be much more
detailed about the nature and impact of the "imported knowledge" . We can differentiate the nature of the
knowledge to be industry specific (leading to within industry externality -i.e. agglomeration - alone: i.e.
Nz  = f(N 2 ,horn  e  Nz,RlApartner X  6AZ  ROW  )  ) or as described above, general (thus contributing to overall
industrial knowledge and therefore having a cross-industry impact). We could also model both aspects for a
more realistic, though less tractable set up: x:  = f(Hzx,  N 2 , , Nz 2 , N Xl-,  ).  Imports into a specific
industry will affect the development of goods in that industry  differentially than innovation of goods in the
economy in general. To ensure differential impact, we could attach different "weights" or  "impact parameters"
to Nz E  (industry specific imported variety) versus N,,,-2 (non-industry specific imported variety) .
38For  simplicity,  assume  that  goods  diversity  is  such  that  there  is  little  overlap  between
intermediate inputs60  so that we can express N as:
(6')  N = Niore  +  51  NRpApartner +  e52 NROW
where  0 < ,1 < 1 and 0 <￿  2  < 1 are the parameter determining the degree of free access of  the
other RIA partners and ROW's  differentiated intermediate exports to  the Southern (home)
country's market.
Formally, this  market  restriction can  result from  price  differentials in  intermediate
imports from RIA members versus ROW.  However, we abstract from the  development of
equilibrium price and wage conditions attached to this trade restriction. Suffice it to say that one
modeling avenue would be to tack on a tariff (ad valorem) to the ROW prices, rendering their
products less competitive.  In other words, prices within and without the RIA will be different
for intermediate inputs.  By extension, the wages paid to the human capital involved in the
industry producing them will not equalize across the two regions.
Anti-monde  1-Autarky:  'l  =52 = °
Assume: (i) c>  1,
(ii) No goods variety overlap (no redundancy  effect),
(iii)  1 = (52  = 0 in equation (6) - i.e. there is no trade and no exchange of information
with ROW,
60 This assumption reduces the role of  the redundancy  effect of regional integration and trade liberalization in
growth analysis. In effect, it says that  specialization  has already occurred to a great degree and that opening
the economy to the world or a subgroup of it (an RIA) will not have significant growth impact  through the
specialization/redundancy avenue.  In other words, the competition effect between domestic intermediate input
producers and new intermediate imports is minimized here, so that there is very little domestic industry
rationalization in this specific market.
39(iv) The number of differentiated intennediate inputs in  each of  the two  symmetric
southern  countries  are  limited  to  the  nationally  produced  varieties  in  autarky
(Nhome  =NKIApanfer  <N  w),
Anti-monde 2 - Regional Trade: S5  21,  52  =  0
Forming a  South-South RIA will have the following results:
(1).  It will double  the pool  of knowledge  (N  = Nhomc + NRPJp,,,,r,er)  and the human  capital
working in the R&D sector (HX = H'  e + H',,  e  61
(2) The RIA formation lowers the cost of innovation from the vantagepoint of the home
country and its RIA partner.  Equations five applied to each member country will become:
(5')  w
(  Nh  e + NRJApa.pnner
(3)  The  market  enlargement  will  have two  contradicting  effects:  improved  profits
prospects due to the enlarged market will be countered by more intense competition in it, so that
the incentive to innovate is unchanged.(Walz, 1997:315;  Rivera-Batiz & Romer, 1991).
(4) (1) and (2) will lead to scale effects on output.
Furthermore, note that:
1.  The rate of innovation will be four times that of each of the autarkic southern country
rate because equation (4) is now:
(7)  x  =(H.xbOm,  +Hx  PJApMr  )(Nhome  +  NRpjartner)
and since the southern countries are symmetric:
x=  (2 HZxhome  )(2Nhome)
61 Refer to equations 3 and 6' and recall that our model assumes that R&D  creates and produces intermediate inputs.
402.  In steady state, both the market enlargement effect and the redundancy effect (which
we have assumed away here) are exhausted.  The true dynamic growth effect is the scale effect
that is prompted by the dynamics determining the rate of innovation at the domestic leve1 62 in
each member country.
3.  While theoretically possible, we can not separate the scale effect from the market
enlargement effect in our econometric exercise. Furthermore,  we can not directly account for the
human capital component affecting creation/production  of intermediate inputs 63.
Anti-monde  3 - Open Regionalism:  8.  = 1, 82  < 1
If  we assume  an open  regionalism (hereafter OR) anti-monde, ascension to  a RIA
constrains the ROW's imports. Such constraints( e.g., , a positive tariff) on ROW exports to
member countries can be quantified in our framework as  0 <  ￿52  < 1.  The closer  62  to 0  the
more "closed" the regional arrangement to ROW, slowing the rate of innovation (scale effect)
and  the  consequent  growth  in  the  RIA member  countries  growth rate  by  reducing  the
contributions of  NROW to equations (4) and (5-5') and (6').
This loss is enhanced by the two factors:  the ROW is assumed to be larger than each of
our  southern countries  do  and  have  a  comparative advantage in  creation /  production  of
intermediate inputs (recall that  N,Om  e= NpjPariner  <  NROW).  Puga  and Venables (1997) and
Ruhashyankiko (1997) both confirm that such an arrangement would have negative implications
for the members of the RIA.
62  This has  been shown  by Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)  and  Rivera-Batiz  and Romer  (1991).
63  We have no industry level data on human capital
41As discussed in the literature, this model also suggests that open regionalism is a positive
development compared to  autarky and regionalism, since it allows for  constrained entry of
NROW'  However, it is still an inferior choice to that of multilateral free trade.  In fact, we think
that the following proposition will hold true:
Proposition  1:  given  that  (i)  or  > 1, (ii)  NlI?4pariner  <NROW.  The  larger  the  elasticity  of
substitution  C-  and  the smaller  the ratio  0 < NR4patner  < 1, the smaller  the  impact  of regional
NROW
trade agreements  on output growth compared  to  free  trade.
In our empirical  analysis, we  do not have the opportunity to  verify these  scenarios
independently.  However, we note that both the Andean Group has  engaged in  multilateral
liberalization while simultaneously reviving their respective RIA.  It appears that we are in a
situation akin to "open regionalism".  In order to account for these simultaneous developments,
our empirical exercise will control for the effects of the multilateral liberalization on industrial
growth by introducing import variety series for non-RIA suppliers. These series are comparable
to the ones calculated for RIA suppliers.
Empirically, we will rely on our three measures of intermediate import variety (discussed
in main text) to capture the impact of the revival of the Andean Pact agreement on the industrial
growth of each member  country.  Each of  these measures in  effect represents alternative
empirical valuations of  the  NRIApariner  and  NRO?W  terms in equation (6')  and the subsequent
analysis.
4.  Based on the model and assumptions above, we expect:
42(a)  each member to  register an increase in the variety of imported goods from other RIA
members from the RIA renewal date onward.  We expect our three variety measures to capture.
this increase.
(b)  we expect a positive and significant econometric correlation between these variety
measures, represented by the generic VAR term here, and industry level growth in equations (8)
and (9) in the main document, reproduced here:
(8)  dyi, = a,  + ydx,, + A VAR  + [de,, + dai, ]
(9)  dyi, =  a, + ydx,,  + Kdx, + AVAR  +  [4da,  +  dui,]
a,  is a constant. xi, = a 1i,li,  +  a 2 1,k,, + a 3i,Mi,  64  [de  ,  + dai,  ] in equation (8) and [4,dai,  + du,,  ] in
equation (9) are the error terms.
Part II.  Incorporating within and Cross-industry  externality into the growth model.
How would increased intermediate imports initiate a within and cross-industry scale response?
We view new varieties of intermediate imports as stores of foreign knowledge. We
conceptualize that they have a strong industry specific knowledge accumulation component, and
a more diffuse overall/general knowledge component.  They affect the base of knowledge in the
importing country in the following two complementary manners. At the cross-industry level,
they enlarge the general, public base of knowledge, providing further incentives for innovation
by  reducing the  cost  of  innovation/production of  intermediate goods across all  industries
(nationally).  Also, availability of new varieties of intermediate imports (competing with the
64by using the dx,  -fi,it dlj, + '82i,  dk, terminology and not directly estimating A,,  and )82ft coefficients we
lose inforrmation  about the changes in the contribution  of labor and capital to production. One interesting
extension of this exercise would be to perform this analysis with estimated beta coefficients.
43domestic supplying industries for instance) improves production efficiency and lowers input
costs in industries using them for production of final goods 65.
We abstract from  arguing that within industry externalities are directly correlated to
agglomeration effects resulting from the RIA 66. We still attribute these externalities to  the
increased variety of intermediate inputs. For this we rely on the argument above, that there are
potentially strong industry specific knowledge gains from imports introduced into that industry
that are not replicated at the same level or intensity in other industries. Therefore, the dynamics
of innovation and growth could be more potent at the industry level 67.
We can also model a  cross-effect between the RIA measures and  within and cross-
industry economies of scale in alternative ways.
In the first case, equations (8) and (9) will become 68:
(10)  dye,  =a,  +ydx,, +±VAR+u(VARdx,,)+[de,,  +da,,]
dy,,  = a,  + ydx,  + Kdx, + AVAR  + u(VARdx, ) + c(VARdx,  ) +
[Xda,  + du , ]
For equations (10) and (11) we again interpret the coefficients  u and  c  on the cross-
effect terms  as the  impact of integration on economies of  scales (both  within and  across-
65 This is a level effect. The only way it will have long term growth impact is if the variety of imported goods is
expanded continuously, thus "piling" level effects on top of each other at infinitum.
66 We do not directly model the prerequisites for an agglomeration  outcome since it requires cross-country factor
movements (which we abstract from in our basic model in Appendix 1) and involves the more detailed analysis
of centripetal and centrifugal economic forces between the integrating (see also Puga and Venables, 1997;
Ruhashyankiko's 1997).
67 Another way of modeling this dichotomy in the knowledge accumulation is to argue that the human capital is so
specialized and productive in the set -up of the specific industry it is working in that  it will "extract" more
knowledge from its industry specific imports  than the rest of the industries could. Alternatively, we could
argue The human capital is differentiated by industry and therefore is less productive when having to absorb
(or invent) in a general arena versus its own specific industry.
68  Harrison (1994) uses a similar set up for her analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on firm behavior in
Cote d'Ivoire.
44industries) and by extension on growth.  We expect both u and c  to be positive and significant:
regionalism (as proxied by increased variety of intermediate imports) enhances within industry-
and external EOS and by extension growth.
An altemative approach is that of scaling the intermediate import flows into own industry
inputs and cross-industry inputs series using country specific input-output tables.
We expect to observe a differentiated  output response to these two series in equations (8)-(1  1).
A third and final approach would be to more specifically model regional partner's effects
on home country within and cross-industry terms.  One simplistic measure would be to use the
sum  of the trade  (bilateral) weighted regional partner's within and  cross-industry terms in
equations (8)-(1  1) as proxy for the impact of the revival of the regional arrangements.
45Appendix 3
Data
The  major  concern  throughout  is  compatibility of  data  across  countries  and  the
procedures applied to them to ensure the possibility of comparative analysis.  For this reason,
and  serious  weaknesses  with  data  originating  from  national  sources,  we  have  relied  on
standardized  international organization databases such  as  IMF,  World Bank,  UNIDO and
Comtrade, using domestic sources as complementary  sources when possible.
The analysis is based on 22 industries 69 for 1971-1994.  The analysis concentrates on
70 Bolivia,  Ecuador  and  Colombia  . Venezuela lacked value  added  and  intermediate inputs
information and we could not  perform a  full analysis at present.  The 3-digit data on  the
countries'  industrial  gross  output  production,  gross  fixed  capital  formation,  number  of
employees, labor remuneration and intermediate inputs were obtained from UNIDO database.
We calculate intermediate inputs as the difference between gross output and value added. Labor
and  intermediate input  shares are  calculated as  shares of  gross  output and  capital  as  the
remainder.  We used GDP deflators to create real series when necessary.
Capital stock is calculated using the modified version of Goldsmith perpetual inventory
method:
Ki(t) = Is(t)  +(  (-di)ij(t- 1) +(  (-d  i)21 (-2) + ...+ (1  -di)"K#(  -n)
Investment series was deflated using each country's implicit invesment price deflator and some
industry level data gaps were filled using the national gross domestic fixed investment growth
rates.  Both sets of data are from IMF statistics.  A 10 percent discount rate was applied in the
formula.  This is typical in the literature (e.g. Caballero and Lyons) when actual depreciation
rates are not available.
The import data is from COMTRADE UN database.  It reports the value of bilateral
imports in US dollars by industrial or product categories for 1970-1994. We use 3 digit ISIC and
4 digit SITC data series from this database.  After calculating the supplier and variety series by
industry categorization and supplying nation, we scale them using country specific input-output
tables.  This is to account for the impact of the imported intermediate inputs on own and other
industries.
69  We discarded coal and petroleum (354, 353), leather products (323) , other chemical industries (352),  non-ferrous metals
(372), and pottery, china, etc... (361) for either severe data deficiencies or severe and unexplainable changes in data values.
70 Venezuela  lacked  value  added  and intermediate  input information  and a full analysis  could not be performed  at
present.  We had to discard a study  of Peru early on because  of significant  missing  data problems.
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Brief Review of Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador Economic Facts
BOLIVIA71
A  small economy of  some 6.5, Bolivia's  GDP per  capita in  1993 was $821.  The
distribution of wealth is highly unequal in this country still dominated by rural households.  It
has resumed a positive real rate GDP growth of 2.0-3.0 percent in 1993 and 1994.
It's major exports have historically been metals (tin, zinc,...), gas, and more recently non-
traditional agricultural exports such as soybean.  The majority of its imports are in capital goods
and raw and intermediate inputs. Its major trade partners are the US, Japan, the EEC, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and the Andean Pact.  This partner composition has not changed since the late
1970s.  The Andean Pact has acquired an increasingly important role in Bolivia's trade in the
1990s.  It constitutes an  increased share of Bolivia's  imports (from 4 percent in  1990 to 8
percent in 1994) and exports (from 6 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 1994), closing on the only
other major developing trade partner:  Argentina. (IMF 1996 :table 57, statistical annex).
Historically, in  the  1970s:  The  1952 revolution established state  capitalism and  a
methodology of government intervention that heavily influenced capital accumulation.  The
decade of the 70s was associated with a comtnodities, oil and gas boom, growth of capital inflow
and indebtedness, but not much private investment took place during this period despite political
stability and government encouragements.  Much of the investment was undertaken by the
government and many turned out to be inefficient industrial complexes. The economy grew at a
rate of 4.5 to 5 percent per year during the decade.
The debt crisis exploded in the 1979 and the government attempted a crisis management
and stabilization program consisting of devaluation and demand side repression in December
1979.  The program was disrupted by a coup in 1980 and  subsequent attempts at stabilization
failed.  In the early 1980s the country experienced negative average annual growth rate of -4.0
percent and a major episode of hyperinflation during 1982-85.
Faced with severe economic crisis in the mid-80s, the government undertook far-reaching
economic reforms to restructure and stabilize the economy.  These reforms were deepened in
1989. The reforms included financial, public entreprise, mining sector, trade, price,  exchange
rate and capital market liberalization, tax structure and administration.
Of more direct interest with regards to imports: (IMF, 1996, pg 47).
The unilateral trade reform was implemented in 1985 and has been steadily pursued and
deepened.  While previously Bolivia had  a  low nominal average tariff  of  12.1%, effective
protection was high on consumer durables and lowest on capital goods for agriculture due to
tariff escalation.  The reform introduced a trading system virtually free of restrictions.  All
quantitative restrictions on imports are removed except for public health and national security.
In 1986, a 20% uniform tariff was introduced to be decreased further by 1988. The tariff system
has not changed since 1990 with a low uniform tariff of 5 percent on capital goods and  10
percent on all other goods.
71This  information obtained from IMF's "Bolivia -recent economic developments -1996"; Francis Ng, (1994);
WB, report no. 13067-BO, 1994;  Juan Jose Echavarria "Trade flows in the Andean countries: Unilateral
liberalization or regional preferences?", 1998, mimeo
47Export promotion led to a 10% duty draw back scheme in 1987, reduced to 6% in 1990
and suspended in  1991 due to fiscal difficulties.  In  1992, the government simplified export
procedures guaranteeing freedom to export, access to international credit sources, import tax
reimbursement to exporters, and convertability of national currency.  The foreign exchange
regime has also been reformed.  The Boliviano has experienced a depreciation of 13% between
1990-1995
Stabilization did materialize and a fragile external balance and growth have resumed.
The unexpectedly low and fragile growth is partially due to recovering - but as of yet still low -
of private savings rate (only 5.3  percent of GDP in 1993- WB, report no. 13067-BO, 1994:5).
However, imports have been buoyant, reflecting increases in investment.
Bolivia has  been pursuing greater trade rapport with the Mercosur and  Andean Pact
countries and LAIA.
The pattern of trade in the late 70s and early 80s: major exports were again concentrated
in minerals and hydrocarbons, followed by agricultural products.  At this time soybean was not
an exported commodity yet.  Merchandise imports:  consumer goods constituted a relatively
steady 18-22 percent of the total imports during this period.  Raw materials and intermediate
goods composed another 30-38% of the imports, the rest forming capital imports.
The direction of trade:  During the late  1970s and early  1980s, Bolivia'smajor  trade
partners are the US, Japan (for imports but not exports), EEC, Argentina, Brazil and Chile.  The
Andean Pact ( members Peru and Colombia) does play a minor role as an export destination (up
to 4.7 percent in 1980, before decreasing to 2.3 percent in 1983) and as import source (a 3-5%
share of total Bolivian imports during 1977-1983)
Exports in the 1990s: the pattern of goods imports and exports is very similar to that of
the early periods.
It's major exports are mining and carbohydrate products (tin, gold, silver, zinc, gas, petroleum...)
and non-traditional agricultural exports.  Metals accounted for a  minimum of 40 percent of
Bolivia's  exports  during  1990-1995.  Soybean and  soybean oil,  timber,  sugar  and  coffee
represented a minimum of 30 percent of exports during this period.  Gas exports has abruptly
declined from a high of 25 percent of total exports in 1990 to below 10 percent in 1995. (IMF,
1996: 39).
Import structure in the 1990s:
Imports have risen  steadily from US  $962.7 M in  1990 to  US  $  1279 M  in  1994.
Consumer goods constitute some 20 percent of the imports during the 1990s. Capital goods have
held an approximate share of 40 percent.  The share of raw materials and intermediate inputs in
total imports has risen from 26 percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 1994.  Among these, imports of
industrial inputs have climbed from US $ 194.1 M to US $ 355.2 M (from 20 percent to 28
percent of total imports). (IMF, 1996: table 56, statistical appendix).
Manufacturing sector:
The manufacturing sector is a small contributor to the Bolivian economy.  In  1994, it
constituted  15% of  GDP.  The production is mostly for domestic consumption, with  food
products, beverages and tobacco and textile accounting for almost two thirds of the total in 1995
(IMF, 1996:8).  Another 25 percent corresponds to petroleum, coal and (and gas) derivations.
The remaining industries contribute a very small share to output, with Woods products at 5.6%,
non-metallic minerals at 4.3% as highest contributors.
48COLOMBIA 72
Up  to  mid  1980s, Colombia  espoused an  import  substitution development policy,
protecting industry and agriculture via various trade tools, including high tariffs and quotas while
promoting exports through tax, credit and exchange support measures.
In 1984, Colombia started reducing most import prohibitions, import licensing, and rationalizing
its tariff structure. Between 1984-1989: import prohibitions fell from 16% of tariff lines to 1%
and  import licensing  fell  from  93% of  all  tariff lines to  60% and  were  granted  virtually
automatically. Later in the 1990s, this share dropped to 2% of all tariff lines.  In 1990, a major
trade liberalization process was initiated.  At the time, the early dispersion of tariffs was very
large: 0-200% in 25 steps, The  range was first reduced to 0-62.7% and later to 0-20%.  Simple
average tariff decreased substantially, from 61% in 1984 to 32.3% in  1988 and 11.5% in 1992
(with 5 levels). The trade reform also included reduction in export subsidies.
Between 1970-1995, Colombia GDP grew by an average of 4.5% per year. In the 1990s,
it is expected that this average will be met and may be surpassed.  Investment rate, capital
formation, foreign direct investment have all grown during the 90s.  One consequence has been
the real  foreign exchange rate has experienced a 20 % steady appreciation between 1990-1995,
affecting exports.
Generally, up to the mid-1980s, dependence on coffee exports and minerals (petroleum,
coal, other minerals, etc...) were rather high.  Between 1990-1994, however, industrial exports
have grown from 20% of total exports to 32%.
Import has also grown rapidly since 1986, increasing pace since the 1990 unilateral trade
reforms (17% of GDP in 1994). The good news is that some 45% of imports are capital goods,
40% are semi-manufactured and only 15% are consumer goods.
The revival of the Andean Pact started in 1989 and the countries achieved FTA in 1991.
There are however, exceptions. For instance, tariff quotas was applied to a few products within
the Andean Pact agreements.  The automotive industry is a major benefactor of these trade
constraints. Import quotas were applied to a few agricultural  product.
One noteworthy result  of this  revival has  been a  substantial increase in  trade  with
Venezuela (US 518M to US 2218 M) and Ecuador (from US 167M to US 696 M)  a four-fold
increase in both cases.  In 1995, the Andean Pact composed 17.5% of Colombian exports and
13.3% of  its imports, much larger shares that in the pre-revival period.  Note however, that the
US,  Canada and  the EU  are still very  important trade partners to  the  country, composing
approximately 60% of its exports and  58% of its imports.
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49Ecuador is  a  country of  I1 millions, with two economic centers:  Andean regions,
relying mostly on government and domestic agricultural production (Quito), coastal regions,
thriving on commerce. Before the discovery of oil in the Amazon, Ecuador was one of the
poorest economies in Latin America.
The early 1970s was the advent of the petroleum era. Expansion of central government
expenditures, services and borrowing from abroad. Incomes doubled Ecuadorans experienced a
rapid improvement in living standards within the following decade.  However, the decline of oil
prices was followed by debt crisis in 1979-80.
Most  of  the  1980s was  spent  undertaking recurrent  stabilization efforts  to  control
macroeconomic imbalances.  Economic growth since the early 80s has averaged less than 3
percent per year, and the country has experienced a declining standard of living.
With an erroding standard of living, Ecuador has a GDP per capita of $1300 in  1996, and a
highly skewed distribution  of wealth.  However, during the  '80s,  due  to  lack of  political
consensus and  strong interest  groups, the import-substitution development strategy was not
changed, except for some financial and price liberalization in mid-decade and subsequent trade
reform.  These beliefs and resistance is still at work in the 1990s. It seems that the corner was
finally  turned in  1992 when the  government started  a  restructuring program.  Increased
economic integration with the Andean Pact countries and economic recovery in other Latin
American countries has help with the growth of Ecuador's regional exports.
The manufacturing sector constituted some 17% of GDP value added in 1970.  Over the
past 25 years, this  share has inched up 20 to 22% of GDP.  However, the share of employment
in  manufacturing has hovered around  12% over the period, a  reflection of a  highly capital
intensive  manufacturing  sector.  This  high  capital  intensity  was  fostered  via  investment
subsidization policies  and  policies  that  rendered labor  costly.  However, the  comparative
advantage of the country is labor intensive and natural-resource-based  goods.
For most of the period the production has gone to satisfy domestic demand. And the light
traditional  industries (food,  tobacco, textiles, and  wood)  are  still  the  dominant  industries,
constituting 70% in  1980s.  The structure of the manufacturing sector moved towards more
heavier industries. However, export of manufactured goods grew and became more diversified.
By  1981, manufactured goods,  accounting for  23%  of  exports,  included  processed  foods,
manufactured wood products,  petroleum derivatives, metallic products,  straw  hats,  electric
appliances and some textiles and leather products.
A round of trade liberalization occured in the early 1970s but was rolled back with the
onset o f the debt crisis in the early eighties and protectionist feelings it arose. The new round of
multilateral liberalization took place almost simultaneously with the revival of the Andean Pact
and has led to reduced tariff rates and removal of NTBs since the early 1990s. Concurrently, the
currency has appreciated from 1990 to 1995.
50Appendix  5
Andean Pact
* Created in 1969 by Bolivia, Columbia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela. Chile left in 1976.
*  Main objective was to enlarge their small domestic markets and promote
industrial development through regional rather than domestic import
substitution policies.
* Reaching their main objective involved:
1. regional industrial planning
2.  trade liberalization
3.  consessionary measures to less developed members (Bolivia and
Ecuador)
. The Pact not very successful up to late 1-980s  due to:
1. the blending of regional industrial planning and consessionary
measures created enough exceptions as to minimize the impact of the RMA  to
a small impact on trade.
2.  debt crisis of the 1980s.
* Renewal of the Pact in 1989 with the Declaration of Ica.
* Creation of free trade area in 1991, with the following goals:
1. total elimination of tariff and NTBs on intemral  trade
2.  elimination of preferences for less developed member countries
3.  eliminated the regional industrial planning goals.
4.  expanded investment code granting national treatment to foreign
investment.
* Results: strong impact on trade intensity. Total intra-group imports and
exports shares have increased markedly.
From Foroutan, 1997.
51Graph  1:  Andean Pact's  Ratio of Regional  to World Imports
(Industrial products,  1971-1995)
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